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ABSTRACT
We analyze the relation between corruption, competition and inequality in
a developing economy context where markets are imperfect and there is wealth
inequality. We consider an economy where different types of households (po-
tential firms) choose whether to enter production sector or not. The potential
firms may be either efficient or inefficient. The credit market is characterised
by information asymmetry and wealth inequality. As a result the market fails
to screen out the inefficient types. In addition to the imperfect screening in
the credit market, the inefficient type’s entry is further facilitated by corruption
in the product market. These inefficient types also find it profitable to engage
in corruption and their presence in the market leads to a rise in corruption.
We analyze the market equilibrium and look at some of the implications. We
show that a rise in inequality can lead to an increase in corruption, and greater
competition and higher levels of corruption can co-exit.
Key Words: Corruption, Competition, Credit Market, Inequality, Screening.
JEL Classification Number: D60, I20, R20.
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1 Introduction
Corruption has received a lot of attention from various quarters- especially in
the context of developing economies. In both academic as well as policy circles,
there is a general perception that greater competition is associated with low
levels of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Ades and di Tella, 1999). Recently,
however, this view has come under further scrutiny (Laffont and N’Guessan,
1999). The last decade has seen liberalization, freeing up of many markets and
large scale entry of private firms1, but corruption seemed to be on the rise.
One can associate many developing and transitions economies with ‘increases
in competitiveness of the economic environment and a rise in corruption’. In
this paper we provide an explanantion of why competition and corruption may
co-exist. Our approach analyzes corruption in a multimarket framework and
explicitly takes into consideration other factors which are common features of
these economies- wealth inequality and market imperfections. We show that
inequality plays a crucial role in understanding the link between corruption and
competition. In the literature2, corruption is studied mainly in the context of
problems in that particular market, be it informational asymmetries or incentive
structure. While we do not doubt the merit of this, we feel that it is important
to see if this problem is related to imperfections in other related markets. Here,
our focus is on the link between corruption in the product market and wealth
inequality and imperfections in the credit market. We argue that they reinforce
each other and it may not be sufficient to look at just corruption alone.
In this context it is important to bear the nature of corruption in mind.
Most of the literature adopt what we call a ‘victimization’ approach- agents pay
bribes because of extortionary demand by the public officials3. Bribe paying
1The number of firms reported by CMIE for the manufacturing sector of India has gone
up from 1481 in 1990 to 4272 in 1999. Similarly, in many East Europen countries the growth
in the number of small private firms is quite noticeable.
2 See Bardhan (1997), Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) for recent surveys on corruption.
3Most of the leading models i.e. Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bliss and di Tella (1996)
and the recent firm level studies discussed later, follow the extortion view. This is not true
for the agency based models of corruption-i.e. Mookherjee and Png (1995), Laffont and
N’Guessan(1999).
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agents are not viewed as the real beneficiaries. We don’t deny this but we argue
that the extortion view does not explain the whole picture. Corruption also
involves collusion and agents differ in terms of their benefits from corruption.
This feature of corruption is key to the present paper.
It is quite clear from the extortion view of corruption that as extortion
payments increase, profitability decreases and fewer firms stay in the market4.
The causation can run in reverse also. Fewer firms would mean higher profit
(monopoly rent) and this leads to greater possibility of bribe extraction and
more corruption. Firms with monopoly rents have the incentive to bribe officials
to retain their monopoly profit. So in this case, corruption would imply that
potential competitors are denied entry into the market, hence corruption helps
reduce competition. On the other hand, if we take the collusion view and
consider markets where efficient and inefficient firms can coexist, the opposite
results may follow. It is possible that these highly inefficient firms thrive because
of corruption and corruption allows the entry of these firms.
However, corruption alone may not be sufficient. Other forms of imperfec-
tions are also necessary for the presence of these firms. If these firms are ineffi-
cient (high risk and low return), how do they exist in the market? Won’t market
forces drive them out? Possibly yes, but as we show informational problems and
wealth constraints in the credit market may contribute to these inefficient firms’
existence. Hence, in some sense, corruption surfaces in the product market be-
cause of inequality and informational problems in the credit market. More
specifically, we analyze how the credit market is not able to screen out ineffi-
cient firms. The screening mechanism breaks down because some households
are wealth constrained. Since the inefficient type firms engage in corruption, it
affects not just their payoffs but also the payoffs of the efficient firms and deter-
mines the overall market outcome. The inefficient firms tend to get subsidised
4Bliss and diTella (1996) first addressed the relation between corruption and competititon.
The same issue has been developed from different perspectives in Laffont and N’Guessan (99),
Ades and diTella (99). This howerver is not related to other notion of competititon among
public officials which might reduce corruption. Some would argue (see Rose-Ackerman (1996))
that any kind of competition would reduce corruption.
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inthe credit market and benefit from corruption- thus making their operation
viable and possibly profitable.
Even though we do not model competition in the product market, our pa-
per is similar to the studies looking at the relation between competition and
corruption. Here also the number of firms in the production sector is being
determined endogenously. As has been rightly pointed by Bliss and di Tella
(1996), one would need to go beyond the simple measure of the number of firms
to capture competition. But we don’t have any alternative measure. Competi-
tion, in the sense of simply the number of firms, may not be a good outcome
in our model context. If too many inefficient types enter the market at the cost
of the efficient types then the total number of the firms might go up but the
total expected output might be less. So the effect of corruption on competition
is not quite straightforward. Corruption can lead to a rise in the total number
of firms5.
Although corruption manifests itself in many ways, here we only consider the
problem of firms engaging in various acts of bribery to avoid legal costs of doing
their business. These costs could include taxes, hiding of output, failure to meet
standards and controls. There is a sizable literature looking at this problem but
mainly from the public organizational point of view. It looks at why public
officials accept bribes and what can be done to reduce this problem. Only
recently, the focus has shifted somewhat towards the firms and one can ask why
firms pay bribes. Hellman et.al. (2000) report a firm level questionnaire based
survey6 and argue that firm governance should also be considered in addition
to national governance. Similarly, Johnson et.al. (1999) use a survey of private
manufacturing firms in a selected set of East European countries to study the
relationship between corruption and hiding of output by the firms. Svensson
(2003) finds (based on a survey of firms in Uganda) that there is significant
differences between bribe payments by firms. In our framework, firms differ in
5Over-crowding due to market imperfections has been noted, see for example deMeza and
Webb (1992).
6They use the 1999 BEEPS data and analsye response from a large sample of firms in more
than 20 countries in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Bloc. We discuss it in the next section.
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terms of their benefits from corruption and only the inefficient (low profitability)
end up paying bribes for various illegal activities7.
Our paper differs from other papers in the literature in three main aspects.
First, the paper uses a multi-market framework to explore the link between
corruption, competition and wealth inequality. Credit market imperfections
coupled with wealth inequality leads to corruption. Corruption makes the situ-
ation worse by leading to exit of the low risk firms and further entry of high risk
firms. Our model captures the various kinds of externalities that one type might
generate for other types. This can lead to a somewhat different focus so far
as policy implications are concerned. It shows that policy intervention crucially
depends on the nature of outcomes in the other market. Policy intervention
in the credit market, for example, will depend on the extent of corruption. In
some cases, corruption makes it difficult to implement other policies aimed at
addressing the credit market problems arising out of inequality. Likewise, anti
corruption policies have to be evaluated in the light of the credit market out-
comes. In general, anti corruption policy analysis take a partial equilibrium
approach and focus on the same market where corruption takes place (in this
case tax collection). In the present case that would mean looking at tax reforms
and system of incentives for the tax inspectors. Our paper, complementary to
this approach, would point also in the direction of the credit market. This,
we consider, is an important point to bear in mind while designing policies es-
pecially in developing countries where more than one market exhibit various
kinds of imperfections. This view in a wider context is not new8, but is worth
emphasizing in the context of corruption.
Second, the collusion-view of corruption generates different implications com-
pared to the extortion-view of corruption. We feel that both the features
7This is opposite to view that firms hide and engage in illegal activities because they are
subject to extortion, see Shleifer (1997). But as Johnson et.al. (1999) rightly point out, it is
not possible to ascertain whether firms pay bribes because they hide or they hide beasue they
are subject to extortion.
8To consider a recent example from the debate on child labour, many authors (see Basu
2000) would argue that the prescription does not necessarily lies in reforming labour laws or
trade laws.
4
of corruption are important in understanding corruption in most developing
economies.Third, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to provide
a plausible explanation of how inequality may engender corruption. The few
papers (Gupta et. al 2002, Li et. al. 2003) which discuss inequality in the
context of corruption mainly look at how corruption leads to more inequality
empirically.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide some empirical
observations showing how inequality can be crucial in understanding the link
between competition and corruption. In the next section, the basic model is
described and we provide a short summary of the main arguments and results.
Section 4 contains the results and analysis. In section 5 we discuss various
implications and extensions. Lastly, section 6 concludes.
2 Some empirical observations
In this section we present some simple empirical observations which illustrate the
link between corruption, competition and inequality. Our empirical analysis
is based on the BEEPS survey by the World Bank (1999). For a set of 26
transition countries, the survey provides the percentage of firms engaged in
corruption9. The firms have been asked specific questions about the reason
for engaging in corruption such as whether it was for tax purposes or for the
provision of public services etc. Keeping with our basic framework, we have
considered only those firms that have indulged in corruption for tax purposes.
The number of firms surveyed in each of these countries is used as a proxy for
the total number of firms in each country. Since data on wealth inequality are
extremely rare, previous years gini index for income inequality have been used
as proxy; the intuition being that previous years income inequality will reflect
on the current periods wealth inequality through savings and investments. We
have used the most recent available gini index (of the past years) from the world
9For our analysis we have used 23 countries. Three countries (Albania, Bosnia and Republic
of Serpska) have been dropped because recent gini indices for these countries were unavailable.
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development indicator and the WIDER data set on inequality in these countries
for 1999.
We use three separate logit models to test the link between corruption,
competition and inequality. Our dependent variable is the log of the ratio
of corrupt firms to non-corrupt firms. As is standard for logit models, we name
the ratio of corrupt firms to non-corrupt firms as the odds ratio. As we will
demonstrate later, increase in corruption in our model comes from the increase
in the number of corrupt firms in the economy relative to the number of non-
corrupt firms. Hence the odds ratio allows us to measure the impact of a change
in the exogenous variables on corruption. The first two specifications regresses
the number of firms and the gini index separately on the log of the odds ratio.
The last specification regress both inequality and number of firms together on
the log of the odds ratio. Table 1 summarizes the results from the regression.
Table 1: Regression on log of the odds ratio.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficients
Number of firms 0.000 -0.016*
(0.000) (0.001)
Gini index 0.047** 0.052**
(0.013) (0.015)
Constant -0.524* -2.170** -2.113
(0.229) (0.460) (0.441)
R2 0.000 0.325 0.356
F-statistics 0.04 12.40** 6.61**
Observations 23 23 23
The numbers in the brackets are the (robust) standard
errors. * Shows significance at 10% level. ** Shows
significance at 1% level.
From the above table it is clear that while inequality is significant in ex-
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plaining the odds ratio, number of firms, which is an indicator of competiton,
does not have any impact on corruption. Model 1 therefore validates the point
that increase in number of firms may not necessarily lead to decrease in cor-
ruption. This does not rule out, however, that for some countries competition
may indeed decrease corruption. On the other hand, there may be countries
where competition leads to increased corruption. On the whole, the effect of
competition on corruption remains insignificant. Moreover, the R2 is extremely
low and therefore we need to consider other variables to understand the impact
of the competition on corruption. As we shall argue in the paper, the relation-
ship between competition and corruption is a complex one; and our simplistic
empirical formulation does not capture it properly.
Nest we test for the link between inequality and corruption. Most empirical
exercises in this context have regressed corruption on inequality, thus examin-
ing the case whether corruption worsens the income distribution (Gupta et. al.
2002, Li. et al. 2001). Model 2 on the other hand tests for whether inequal-
ity leads to an increase in corruption. Results from Table 1 indicate that as
inequality increases the number of corrupt firms relative to non corrupt firms
will increase. Although we do not deny that the causality between inequal-
ity and corruption may run in both directions, our interest in this paper is to
provide for an analytical explanation for the observed link from inequality to
corruption. As will be evident later, our analytical model would rely on market
imperfections to establish the link. It should be kept in mind, while we do not
explicitly take market imperfection into account in our empirical exercise, for
most of the transition countries maket imperfections remain pervasive(Svenjar,
2002; Berglof and Bolton, 2002).
However, the most striking result of the empirical analysis comes from model
3. When we control for inequality the coefficient for number of firms becomes
negative. This implies that given inequality, as competition increases, we will
see a higher proportion of non-corrupt firms entering the market thereby reduc-
ing corruption. Therefore, it seems, implicit behind the assertion that compe-
tition reduces corruption, is the assumption that inequality remains unchanged.
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This paper on the other hand attempts to understand the link between compe-
tition and corruption when there is a change in inequality.
3 The model
3.1 A Summary
We consider an economy with different types of households10 (potential firms)
who may choose to undertake (entrepreneurial) production activities. Given
non-convexity in the production process the households choosing production
activity have go to the bank to borrow a certain amount K. Households staying
out of the production sector don’t need to borrow and they have some fixed
outside income. Households are classified into basically two types: good (low
risk) and bad( high risk). The latter type is assumed to be inefficient in the sense
that its production plan fetches lower expected returns. Hence an optimal mix
would seek to maximize the proportion of good type. Production also involves
other costs like taxes, fees and costs of meeting standards and quality control.
We denote these as simply tax T. Inspectors are supposed to ensure compliance
by the firms, but they can collude with the firm and avoid reporting.
The focus is on two levels of interactions. One takes place in the credit
market between the firm and the bank, and the other takes place in the product
market between the firm and the inspector. A particular household’s expected
payoff from undertaking production depends on its type and the outcome of
these two interactions. The first interaction referred to as the credit game de-
termines the cost of capital and the second determines the effective tax payment.
Corruption facilitates the entry of the inefficient firms by raising the expected
payoff. Households can calculate their expected payoff after taking into account
the fact that they can bribe the inspector and save on their tax payment11.
Hence some households who would not have entered the production sector in
10We shall be using both terms ‘households’ and ‘firm’. Households in the production sector
will be referred to as firms.
11This is somewhat similar to the distortionary effect of corruption on occupational choice
or technology choice in Acemoglu and Verdier (1998).
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the absence of corruption would find it profitable to do so in the presence of
corruption. However, the extent corruption also depends on the outcome in the
credit market. If the different types are completely screened in the credit market
then it is difficult to sustain corruption in the tax collection because the efficient
high profitable firms are less likely to engage in concealment and corruption. As
is well known, under certain conditions these types can be separated even when
there is informational asymmetry. This is where wealth inequality matters.
Because some households are wealth constrained, it is not possible to separate
the different types completely. That means some low risk types get pooled with
the high risk types. This raises the cost of capital for these low types and lowers
the cost of capital for the high risk types. The high risk types, in turn, engage in
corruption and earn higher than their true profit. Both these factors contribute
to a rise in the number of the high risk types and fall in the number of the low
risk households.
We have three different agents who act in a strategic fashion: a) households,
b) banks and c) inspectors. We describe the characteristics of each agent below.
3.2 Inspectors
Inspectors are in charge of collecting taxes. However, they are corruptible and
can collude with the firm in exchange for a bribe, d. We assume that there is,
however, an anti-corruption system in place. The anti-corruption inspectors,
presumed to be honest12 , monitor the firms and the tax inspectors. If the firm
evades tax payment by bribing the tax inspector, the bribery is likely to be
discovered with some probability q and both the evading household and the
corrupt inspector are penalized.
12We do not go into issues concerning the corruptibility of these super inspectors, see Basu
et.al.(1992).
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3.3 The Banks
The banks (B) borrow funds from the public at a fixed interest factor r0, and
extend loans of fixed amount K to the firms. Project returns are stochastic.
Let (1 − µi) be the probability of success in a project undertaken by type-i
household. Let ri be the interest factor paid and wi be the amount of collateral
pledged. Various types of assets, which constitute household’s wealth, can serve
as collateral. We assume that the bank incurs a cost associated with having a
collateral. If the bank can observe the types of borrowers then for each type the
bank chooses {ri, wi} such that the bank maximizes
πiB = (1− µi).ri.K + µi.δ.wi ≥ π0, (1)
where δ < 1 shows the cost the banks face in keeping a collateral and i
represents the type of borrowers and π0 = K.r0. In case the bank cannot
observe the different types of borrowers but instead knows the distribution θi
of the different types of the borrowers, the bank maximizes
πB =
X
θi.πiB ≥ π0. (2)
We assume there is perfect competition in the banking sector, so that the
above condition is always satisfied with equality. We shall call it the zero-profit
condition.
3.4 The Households
Households, in our model, can either undertake entrepreneurial activity (firms)
and join the production sector or engage in some outside option. Households
differ in terms of the payoff form their outside option.
As mentioned earlier, when it comes to production, there are two different
types of households, i) households with good projects (g) and ii) households
with bad projects (b). The good projects have a higher probability of success
and in successful states they lead to higher output/gross profit as well. Let Yi
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be the output produced by type-i. We assume for type i, where i = g, b, the
output Yi = 0 with probability µi and Yi > 0 with probability (1 − µi). We
assume that µg < µb and Yg > Yb.
Households also differ in terms of their initial wealth. We assume that some
households have no wealth. These wealth constrained households can have good
or bad projects, but to simplify the analysis we assume that these wealth con-
strained households have only good projects13 and denote this group as p. So we
have three groups, the rich household with good project (g), the poor household
with good project (p) and the rich household with the bad project (b).
Households (firms) engaged in production have to pay various types of taxes.
Some of these would depend on their output or profit and some are fixed in
nature. These include various license fees, lump sum taxes, compliance costs
of various kinds. In many developing economies, these would take the form of
costs associated with safety laws, labour laws. We concentrate on these types
of costs and treat the total cost of doing business to be fixed for all types
of households. This is captured through a lump-sum tax T . In some ways
this should also discourage the b-types from entering the market. However, as
mentioned earlier, the households can bribe the inspector and end up paying a
smaller amount.
It is clear that household’s expected income from entrepreneurial activity
will depend on the cost of evading taxes and the cost of borrowing funds from
the bank. Let Vij represent the expected income of the jth-household within
type-i where
Vij = (1− µi).{(Yi − ri.K)−Xi)}− µi.wi ≥ V 0ij (3)
where Xi is the expected cost (which includes bribe or tax payment) and
V 0ij is the outside option available to the j
th-household of type-i. Note when
production takes place Vij = Vi, ∀j ∈ i.
13We assume that no high risk borrower is collateral constrained. But this can be relaxed
and the qualitative results will not be affected.
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If Vij ≥ V 0ij then the jth-household of type-i will enter into production.
We assume that V 0ij ∈ [V , V ] and all types have the same uniform distribution
over [V , V ]. So Vi will determine what fraction of the household of type-i will
undertake production and enter the credit market.
3.5 The game
After production has been undertaken, depending on the realization of Yi ,
the firm makes a report of its income. The failure state can be viewed as a
bankruptcy state and can always be verified. If the firm declares bankruptcy, the
bank will verify the state and claim the value of collaterals wi. As is standard in
the literature, we assume that a firm will never declare bankruptcy with positive
output14 . In the successful state, the firm makes the due repayment ri.K to the
bank. It is in this state the firm is supposed to pay a tax. However the firm can
pay a bribe to the tax inspector and avoid paying taxes.
Before we begin the analysis it will be useful to summarize the sequence of
moves in the model.
1. Nature chooses the different types of the household i = g, b. The house-
holds decide whether to undertake entrepreneurial activity or not. This decision
is denoted by a ∈ {0, 1}, where a = 1 refers to production activity.
2. The bank offers a contract or a menu of contracts to the households/firms
{ri, wi}.
3. The firm chooses a particular contract.
4. Once the output is realized the inspector and the firm decide whether to
collude and the amount of bribe d to be paid.
5. Following the inspector’s report, taxes are paid and all bribe or incentive
payments are also made.
For convenience, we shall label stages 2-3 as the credit market game and
stages 4-5 as the bribe (tax and corruption) game. Clearly, the outcome in
the bribe game will determine the outcome in the credit market. We shall be
14Here, we are simply following the standard interpretation of debt contracts under costly
state verification.
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looking at equilibria satisfying backward induction and hence we shall always
work with the bribe game first. Note that a precise definition of an equilibrium
would require us to specify actions at each stage 2-5. This will necessitate in-
troduction of more notation and formal analysis. Hence we shall simply focus
on the household’s decision to enter production. An equilibrium in the game
2-5 will induce a unique outcome on household’s entry decisions. Household’s
choice of a depends on the expected payoff Vij from production and the out-
side option V 0ij . As discussed earlier, expected payoff Vij depends on the credit
market outcome. An equlibrium is defined as a tuple {( aij), (ri, wi)} such that
given households’ decision, the credit market is in equilibrium and given the
credit contracts (ri, wi), each household’s decision is optimal. We shall find it
conveneient to describe household’s choice by the particpation rate of different
types of households- denoted by λi. It is the fraction of households enter-
ing production sector. Let ni be the number of i-type households, then given
λi,we can calculate the distribution of different types in the credit market as
θi = (niλi)/
P
niλi.
4 Results and analysis
4.1 Tax and Bribe
After the output is realized, if the firm decides not to pay the required amount
of tax, T , it can approach the regulator for a bribe negotiation. If a bribe
agreement is reached, the firm pays d to the inspector. However, with some
probability q this bribe/ illegal transaction can be discovered. Then both the
firm and the inspector are penalized. The inspector faces a fine f , which may be
loosing the job or a promotion. The firm faces fine h, which may include a loss
of production and loss of reputation in the market in addition to the penalty.
We assume that hi = β.Zi, where β > 0 and Zi is net profit (Yi − ri.K).
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It is clear that bribing occurs iff
T − q(f + β.Z) ≥ 0 (4)
Z ≤ T − q.f
α
=
T
q
− f
β
= Z. (5)
where α = q.β.
Remark 1 There is a critical net income, Z, such that all firms with net profit,
Zi ≤ Z, will engage in corruption.
The intuitive interpretation of this result is that the benefit of corruption
does not increase with income but the cost does. The high profit efficient firms
stand to loose more from the illegal transaction. Alternatively, this could be
interpreted as a situation where a firm looses its license or ceases to operate
once its illegal behavior is detected. In that case only firms who do not have
a long future in the market are likely to take the risk of being illegal. This
argument has been used in the literature in the context of efficiency wage of
the tax inspectors. An inspector is not likely to engage in bribery if the wages
are high, because the inspector would not like to loose this high future stream
of wage income for the present bribe. In our case it is the prospect of future
profitability (not explicitly modelled) which determines a firm’s willingness to
enagage in risky bribe transactions.
To see the bribing process more clearly, let each party make a take it-or-
leave it offer with equal probability. This leads to the standard Nash Bargaining
solution. In that case, with probability 12 the firm will offer q.f . This is the
minimum amount the inspector will accept. On the other hand, with probability
1
2 the inspector will demand (T − α.Z), as this is the maximum the firm would
be willing to pay. Hence the expected bribe would be given by
d =
1
2
[T + q.f − α.Z] . (6)
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Hence the firms would bribe and evade tax iff
T ≥ 1
2
[T + qf − αZ] + αZ (7)
This yields inequality (5) given earlier.
Remark 2 Notice that as q falls (or T rises), Z rises and more firms would be
encouraged to engage in corruption.
4.2 Credit market
In this section we discuss the credit market game. First we consider a benchmark
case where there is no imperfection in the credit market. We will show that
when the banks can identify the different types (g or b) of projects, the wealth
inequality among the households does not matter. Wealth here is mainly in
terms of collaterizable assets. Wealth inequality leads to a situation where
some households can put up collateral and others cannot. The level of wealth
does not affect a household’s need to borrow K or income streams Yi15.
4.2.1 Complete information benchmark
Note that under complete information, there is no need for collateral. This is a
direct implication of the collateral cost. This can be seen in the figure below.
Insert figure 1.
The figure shows the iso-profit curves and indifference curves ( Vi) of the
different types of households in the r×w plane. Given that µb > µg, the b-type
high risk households have a steeper indifference curve. The dotted lines show
the zero profit lines for the bank. Notice that there is a cost associated with the
collateral. This means that the banks will prefer not to have collateral to cover
15A natural interpretation of this wealth would be various assets which can not be used in
the production but households could borrow money against these. It is unlikely that one with
more land would need less capital and borrow less.
15
their loans completely. It can be checked that the slopes (absolute values) of
the indifference curves and the iso-profit curve are given by
∂ri
∂w
¯¯¯¯
V
=
µi
(1− µi).K
(8)
∂ri
∂w
¯¯¯¯
π
=
µi.δ
(1− µi).K
Since 1 > δ > 0, the household’s indifference curve is steeper than the banks
indifference curve. Under complete information, points D and E, in figure 1, are
the equilibrium contracts. Both the p and the g-types will be offered contract
E and the b-types will be offered D.The g-type and the p-type firms will pay a
lower interest rate where as the high risk b-type firms will pay a higher interest
rate.
Let rg and rb denote the corresponding interest factors16 . Let superscript
c deonte the outcome under complete information. Then the net income Zi
of the different types in the successful state would be (Yi − ri.K). Clearly,
Zcb << Z
c
g = Z
c
p. So according to our previous discussion, the b-types are likely
candidates for engaging in corruption. We assume that
Zcb < Z < Z
c
g = Z
c
p (9)
However, this does not guarantee that corruption will take place in equilib-
rium. In this case if the b-types enter production, the expected cost it incurs
is
Xcb =
1
2
[T + qf − αZcb ] + αZcb ,
which includes the bribe it pays and the expected fine if caught. Let V cij be
the expected income of the jth-firm of type-i under complete information. As
mentioned earlier, when production takes place V cij = V
c
i , ∀j ∈ i. The following
condition guarantees that only the households with good projects (rich as well
16 Since rg = rp and Yg = Yp, we are suppressing the notation for the poor in this subsection.
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as poor) will enter production and the households with bad projects will opt for
the outside option.
V cb = (1− µb)(Zb −Xb) < V 0bj , ∀j ∈ b (10)
V cg = (1− µg)(Zg − T ) > V 0gj, ∀j ∈ g. (11)
Condition (11) also implies that V cg > V . For all households of b-type it
is better not to enter production as they will get a higher payoff if they choose
the outside option. Since only households with good projects enter production
then condition (9) leads to no corruption.
Proposition 3 In the complete information case with wealth inequality, if (9)
(10) and (11) hold, only the good projects are undertaken and there is no cor-
ruption in equilibrium. We have λcg = 1 and λ
c
b = 0.
From society’s welfare point of view this would be the ideal case.
4.2.2 Incomplete information and wealth inequality.
The banks do not have information about the types of the households. However,
the distribution of the different types of households is common knowledge. It
is obvious that we are not going to have the standard screening outcome of the
credit market, where the good types are separated from the bad types. Screening
will require the use of collaterals and the poor types with good projects will not
be able to put up the required collaterals. However, the rich types with good
projects can be separated. This can be seen in figure 1.
Recall that contracts E and D are offered under complete information. How-
ever, when types are not known, the above pair of contracts can not be offered.
The bank could now use collateral as an instrument to screen17 the different
types. It is easy to see that a completely separating outcome is not feasible. In
17See Bester (1985) for an early model of screening with collateral. Screening can be achieved
using loan size also but in the present case it is fixed.
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any separating outcome, the g-type will have to put up some collateral. But
since the p-types cannot put up any collateral, the bank is forced to offer them
a contract with no collateral. In that case, it is easy for the high risk b-types to
act as the wealth constrained good types.
As seen in the figure, a semi-separating equilibrium is possible. The g-types
are offered contract B and the p and b-types pool at A. Note that the b-types
have no incentive to deviate from A to B. The p-types cannot deviate to any
contract with w > 0. Moreover, the g-types also have no incentive to deviate to
A. Using superscript s to denote the outcome under semi-separating equilibrium
under incomplete information, let V si represent the expected income of type−i.
Then compared to the complete information case; V sp < V
c
p , V
s
b > V
c
b and
V sg < V
c
g . However, note that V
c
p − V sp > V cg − V sg . In other words, the loss in
income is much higher for the p-types compared to the g-types..
We can rule out a completely pooling outcome if the pooled interest rate
lies above G. This also ensures that no bank can deviate and offer a pooled
contract [r, 0] where
r =
π0
((θg + θp).(1− µg) + θb.(1− µb)).K
(12)
The θi refers to the distribution of different types in the market. The prob-
ability that a borrower belongs to type-i household undertaking entrepreneurial
activity, when the credit market outcome is a pooled one, is gien by θi. Like-
wise, under the semi-seperating equilibrium the pooled interest (partial pooling
of b and p-types) is given by
r∗ =
π0
(θp.(1− µg) + θb.(1− µb)).K
(13)
where θi represents the proportion of type-i engaged in production and
accepting the pooled contract under the semi-separating equilibrium; θi =
θi/(θb+θp), i = b, p. Comparing (12) and (13), it is easy to see that r∗ > r. This
implies that more b-types would enter the market under a completely pooled
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contract and it will not be profitable to offer such a contract in equilibrium.
As we have observed in the previous section, the b-types are more likely to
be corrupt because Zcb < Z. Now in the semi-separating case, Z
s
b > Z
c
b , because
they end up paying a lower interest rate. However, if Zsb < Z, the b-types will
evade taxes and pay a bribe. We continue to assume that
Zsb < Z < Z
s
p < Z
c
g (14)
Now their expected income of the b-types would be given by
V sb = (1− µb)(Zsb −Xsb ), where Xsb =
1
2
[T + qf − αZsb ] + αZsb (15)
Clearly, V sb > V
c
b . Now it is more likely that for some b-types V
s
bj > V
0
bj .
Hence more b-types are likely to enter. On the other hand some of the p-types
will exit the market since V sp < V
c
p . There will also be a drop in the g-types but
not of the same order. All this will depend on the distribution of the outside
payoff. Suppose the following condition holds.
V > V sb > V ,V
s
g > V , V
s
p > V (16)
This implies that despite the reduction in Vg, all the g-types continue to enter
the production and λg = 1. The same need not be true for the poor households
with good projects. On the other hand, compared to the benchmark case,
b−types also enter production sector and λb > 0.This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Under incomplete information and wealth inequality, there ex-
ists a semi-separating screening equilibrium [{r∗g , w∗g}, {r∗, 0}, {r∗, 0}] where the
b and p types pool at r∗and g type separates at {r∗g , w∗g}. We have λsg = 1,λsp ≤ 1
and λsb > 0. There is positive corruption in equilibrium as the b types will enter
the production sector and engage in bribery.
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Note that if condition (14) is not staisfied and we have Zsp < Z; then the
poor households with good projects will also find it worthwhile to engage in
corruption. In this sense, corruption can spread because of the presence of the
b-types in the market.
4.2.3 Changes in Inequality
Suppose there is a rise in inequality of wealth such that the number of wealth
constrained poor households is higher. We can consider a redistribution of
wealth such that nb stays the same, ng falls and np rises. Let us assume that,
prior to redistribution, λsg = 1,λ
s
p = 1 and λ
s
b > 0. This means that as np rises,
the pooled interest rate will fall. At the pre-redistribution particpation rates,
rise in np will lead to a rise in θp and fall in θb. Since (1 − µg) > (1 − µb), it
is clear that (using (13)) r∗ will fall. Consequently, {r∗g , w∗g} will also change
and V sg will rise, but it will make no change to their particpation rate. On the
other hand, V sb will increase and that would lead to more b-type households
in the market. The rise in λb will in fact be the equilibriating force as this
would lead to a rise in θb and arrest the fall in the pooled interst rate. But it
is clear that in the new equilibrium, following the redistribution of wealth, λb
is higher. Since the partcipation rates of the poor and the rich households with
good projects do not change and the redistibution is confined only to them, a
rise in the particpation of the b-type households would lead to an increase in
the number of firms in the production sector and a rise in the number of corrupt
firms. We can state the following corrollary.
Corollary 5 As the fraction of poor households increases following a rise in
welath inequality, more b-type households enter the production sector and there
is a rise in corruption.
This matches well with our earlier observation in section 2 that a rise in
inequality is associated with greater incidence of corruption18. In terms of the
18A recent empirical exercise using cross-country regressions also find that income inequality
increases corruption. See You and Khagram (2003).
20
number of firms, the total number of firms can go up or down depending on the
distribution of the outside option and the value of λp before the redistribution.
For example, if λp < 1, then following the redistribution, λp goes up but the
total number of firms in the market might go down. Irresepective of what
happens to the total number, the number of b-type firms will always go up.
Though it is linked with corruption in an indirect way, wealth inequality
plays a major role in our analysis. In the absence19 of wealth constrained
households informational imperfections in credit market can arise but they will
not have significant bite. As can be seen in figure 1, the complete information
outcome D and E can not be sustained. But one can easily devise a screening
contract shown by points D and F in figure 1, to distinguish the two types of
households. In that case, the g-type households are worse off as a result but the
b-type households are not necessarily better off. Hence, if there is no wealth
inequality, we are not likely to see a large influx of these households into the
production sector.
5 Discussion.
5.1 Competition and Corruption
The b-type households benefit in two ways-their cost of funds is subsidized by the
other households to some extent and they also manage to increase profitability
by avoiding tax payments. Either of these factors alone may not be sufficient
to encourage increased participation by the b-type households. In the text we
showed that in the absence of imperfections in the credit market, there are
no b-type households engaged in production. One could make a similar claim
concerning corruption also. Suppose government pursues a policy (q,β, T ) such
19As the number of p-type households decreases, the partcipation of b-type households also
falls. The nature of the equilibrium does not change so long as there are sufficient number of
p-type households. But in the limit, when there is no p-type household, we can have the well
known problem of existence of equilibrium .
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that corruption can be completely deterred. In such a case if (1 − µb)[Yb −
rgK − T ] ≤ V 0bj , then no b-type will choose to enter even when it can borrow
funds at a subsidized rate. In the credit market, both the g-type and p-type will
be treated in identical fashion and will be offered rg. Neither wealth inequality
nor informational asymmetry will matter. This shows how both these factors
reinforce each other.
Depending on the distribution of the outside options (income from non en-
trepreneurial activity), increased participation by the b-types could lead to a
overall rise in the number of households in the production sector. The rise in
the b-type’s participation can compensate for the drop in the households with
good projects (mainly the p-types) participation. In this sense, a higher number
households in production can coexist with greater corruption. This has been
noted also in Laffont and N’Guessan (1999) in a different context. They note
that increased corruption can co- exist with greater competition in an agency
setting because it might be optimal to tolerate more corruption in equilibrium.
Moreover, greater competition always raises welfare despite increase in corrup-
tion. We are making a separate point here. There is increased corruption in
equilibrium because more households would choose to engage in it. Secondly, as
more b-types participate, welfare might go down. This is because the presence
of these types exert negative externalities and the b-types are more inefficient.
Without adding more structure to the model, it is not possible characterize
welfare in a precise way.
The entry of the b-type households has implications for the anti-corruption
policy. Note that one crucial determinant of the anti-corruption policy is the
probability of detection q. It is possible that q will fall as the number of house-
holds in the production sector increases. The same number of inspectors will
have to monitor a larger population now. This would lead to a rise in Z implying
that more households would find it profitable to engage in bribery. Similarly, a
rise in T would also imply a rise in Z. However, there is a discontinuity in the
rise of corruption here. As T rises sufficiently, the b-type households might not
enter the production sector even though they would have engaged in bribery
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had they entered. So we might see elimination of corruption for sufficiently high
T . The rise in T can also be interpreted in various ways. It could mean that
there are stricter quality controls and standards and non-subsidized inputs. In
that case, a rise in T can be an welcome policy. But the feasibility and success
of the policy would also depend on how profitable the g- type households are.
A high T should not end up discouraging them too. On the other hand if T is
due to high taxes, controls and red tapes, it would be ideal to reduce T .
5.2 Persistence of Inequality
What implications does corruption have on inequality20 in general? Our model
has no immediate answer but extensions to the model can throw some light.
First, one can argue that corruption is reducing the gap between the different
households and in this sense it is reducing (income) inequality. But this might
be misleading. Suppose, nature does not decide the distribution of b and g
types. Households (either poor or rich) have to make some investment (effort) e
prior to the realization of their project type. This investment could be broadly
interpreted as activities like searching for ideas, gather information, exploring
networks and markets. Let the cost of this be given by C(e) and C 0, C 00 > 0.The
probability ρ that the project would be g-type will depend on e, 0 ≤ ρ(e) ≤ 1,
ρ0 > 0 and ρ00 < 0. Like before, let Vb, Vg denote the net payoffs associated with
a bad and a good project respectively. Vp refers to the payoff associated with a
good project by the poor household. Households choose e∗ by maximizing
{ρ(e)Vg + (1− ρ(e))Vb}− C(e)
We have seen that in the absence of any imperfections, Vp = Vg and (Vg−Vb)
is also maximized. This will lead to both poor and rich households choosing
same optimal levels of e∗. However, with market imperfections and corruption,
Vp < Vg and Vb is higher. The general level of investment will be lower than the
20See Gupta et. al. (1998) for a discussion of the effect of corruption on inequality and
poverty.
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no-imperfection case. More importantly, the poor will always invest less than
the rich households and will have bad projects more often. This could mean
that inequality will be sustained.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that when market imperfections exist, greater competition can
coexist with greater corruption. The scope of corruption allows inefficient firms
to survive in the market. As more and more inefficient firms enter the market,
the total number of firms might rise but corruption also rises. It is not our
intention to say which causes what, whether greater competition reduces cor-
ruption or corruption reduces competition. Both these can coexist because of
several other factors- in our case wealth inequality and incomplete information
in the credit market.
We have not modelled competition in an explicit way. Preliminary results
show that this can be done to some extent. The interaction between the efficient
(g-type) and inefficient (b-type) firms in the product market can be analyzed.
This will allow us to make more definite welfare comparisons.
Similarly, wealth inequality affects corruption in a very indirect way. Because
of wealth constraints, credit market fails to screen the b-type and hence they
enter and corruption rises. We can explore the link more directly. One can
model a situation where the household, in addition to choosing whether to
produce or not, also chooses how much to invest (monetary as well as non
monetary resources such as effort) in buying access. This would be similar to
the case where firms spend money on campaign contributions, buy contacts and
spend effort in building political and bureaucratic network. A firm with access
can evade taxes with a higher probability. This ex-ante choice of investment in
access buying can replace the current framework where they bribe later. This
way we can derive a household’s investment in access buying as a function of
household wealth and the type of the project. We leave it for future work.
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